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Public Health Law & Military Medical Assets:
Legal Issues in Federalizing
National Guard Personnel
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ABSTRACT
Background Public health actions may involve military medical
professionals supporting legally- mandated public health efforts.
Issue. The power of military medical professionals to enforce public
health mandates is dictated by the specific laws under which they act. If
National Guard members are "federalized" through activation under Title
10 of the U.S. Code, they are prohibited from engaging in law enforcement
activities under the federal Posse Comitatus Act. Yet if they are activated
under Title 32, they are under state control and hence are able to engage in
law enforcement efforts, which may include public health functions. This
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legal subtlety may delay effective public health responses to emergencies
and disasters.
Discussion. Efforts to address this legal conflict must take into account
the law and policy implicated in public health activities and emergency and
disaster response. Understanding the basis of the conflict, the relevant
public health tools, such as quarantine and compulsory vaccination, and
legal liability issues are imperative to drive appropriate reform.
Conclusion. Through assessments of legal conflicts and public health
activities, clarification of law can result to allow effective use of military
medical assets in emergency and disaster response.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the United States has prohibited the use of its
military in civil law enforcement actions.' The tension between the state's
police powers and the federal government's role in protecting national
interests has been delicately balanced.
An example of this balancing is the use of the National Guard, which can
be activated by state governors in emergency and disaster situations to
address public health issues.2 The National Guard may only be integrated
in federal efforts under highly circumscribed situations as to limit
integration of the National Guard as federalized troops.3
However, the underlying goal in emergency and disaster response law is
to facilitate the complex coordination of all levels of government, including
federal and non-federal military medical personnel, in the effective
mitigation of a large scale public health crisis, while avoiding complicated
legal restrictions. Retrospectively, well-documented civil law enforcement
issues have arisen when military personnel were incorporated into the
disaster response for support of traditional law enforcement actions, but
were not considered when response efforts encroached upon public health
law enforcement. 4
Under ordinary circumstances, public health endeavors are inherently
affected by myriad legal issues for medical professionals, first responders,

1. William L. Shaw, The Interrelationshipof the United States Army and the National
Guard,31 MIL. L. REv. 39, 40-55 (1966).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 8 (2004), available at

http://www.iir.com/globaU/FusionCenter/NRPbaseplan.pdf.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
4. DONALD J. CURRIER, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A
HARMLESS RELIC FROM THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA OR A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO
TRANSFORMATION? 1, 9-11 (2003), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pdffiles/PUB249.pdf; see John R. Brinkerhoff, The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland

Security, J. HOMELAND

SECURITY

(Feb. 2002), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumal/

Articles/brinkerhoffpossecomitatus.htm.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss1/4
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and victims. Yet for the benefit of the polity, during an emergency and
disaster response, where time-critical allocation of resources is essential and
citizens' lives are at stake, the entry of military medical personnel in
support of civil public health objectives cannot be impeded by laws that
might force these individuals to question their status as responders in any
capacity. However, it is this situation that confronts responders in the
current legal infrastructure.
For example, in an attempt to facilitate federal military entry into disaster
response management, recent changes to the Insurrection Act, which were
repealed subsequently, specifically inserted National Guard troops as
federalized military medical personnel into a legal quagmire of disasterrelated laws and state police powers.
The debate surrounding the
Insurrection Act of 2007, and the Act's ultimate repeal, prompt further
examination of how best to ensure proper entry of federal military medical
personnel into the realm of disaster response, with the appropriate legal
protections to ensure timely and adequate support of local and state public
health systems. These include laws, designed more for military activities
over a century ago, that continue to dictate how those in the National Guard
can respond to emergencies and disasters.5
Hence, this article examines how federalized military medical
professionals, including federal active duty personnel such as those in the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and reserve state-based National
Guard that are "federalized" under federal law are potentially restrained
from public health law enforcement, and describes possible methods to
mitigate this result. Part II reviews the statutory basis for the federal
government's use of military forces in times of emergency, and considers
the constitutional authority, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), the
Insurrection Act (IA), the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
of 2007, and the Stafford Act. In Part III, the article describes the use of the
military, both National Guard and federal Department of Defense (DoD)
personnel (that is, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) as disaster response
resources supporting civil authorities. Specifically, the part examines
mechanisms of National Guard activation and current DoD instructions.
Part IV addresses public health law concerns, such as quarantine,
compulsory vaccination, and medical liability, as they relate to federalized
medical military personnel directed to act outside of the IA. Part V then
discusses some recommendations and options to address the issues and
concerns raised. Finally, in Part VI, the article concludes with an emphasis
on addressing policy-based barriers to effective utilization of federalized
military medical personnel.
5.

Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006); see Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 333

(2006).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2009

3

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

II. LEGAL BASIS

A. ConstitutionalAuthority: Permissionfrom the States
The basic construct of the United States Constitution authorizes the
federal government to employ armed military forces in times of civil
disturbance. Article I, Section 8 provides "for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,"
which thereby allows state militias to be deployed as federal entities.6 This
constitutional provision also assigns fiscal responsibility for federalized
troops to the federal government, while yielding militia training
responsibilities, for instance, "providing for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States, . . . the appointment of the
officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress," to the respective states.7
The Constitution assigns the President the responsibility of commander
in chief over any federalized state militia.8 Article II, Section 2 establishes
the chain of command for federalized troops by stating "[t]he President
shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of
the United States." 9
To employ federalized troops, the President must confer with the state to
determine if it will accept armed assistance as defined in Article IV, Section
4.10 This Section states, "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every state

6. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
7. Id.cl.16.
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1. For the purposes of this article, the term "militia"
refers to state sponsored and funded uniformed military units organized for federal and state
missions (i.e., the National Guard). The term "militia" also refers to unorganized, statefunded military units comprised of unpaid volunteers who serve in support of state
emergency response, homeland defense, and homeland security missions. Title 32, § 109 of
the U.S. Code authorizes state establishment of the latter. The California State Military
Reserve is an example of a state-sponsored unorganized militia and is not discussed for the
purposes of this article. Shaw, supra note 1 at 44; see also California State Military Reserve
Act, CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 551-53 (2007). These state uniformed services are staffed by
state resident volunteers who are not financially compensated for their service, unless the
state places them on active-duty status. Id. These forces are state entities whose members
are ineligible for federalized service under Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and are not
available for service via the Insurrection Act. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c). State militias provide
support as "augment staff' to National Guard forces to disaster response, military support of
civil authorities, and Homeland Security missions. Emory J. Hagan, III, Brigadier General,
CSMR Commanding General, Commanding General's Mid-Year Update (June 30, 2008),
http://www.calguard.ca.gov/casmr/Pages/default.aspx.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
10. Id.art. IV, § 4.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss1/4
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in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence."' 1 These constitutional authorities are well established in case
law and have been further refined through U.S. history as delineated in
various laws. 12 Under the Presidential Reserve Call-Up Authority (PRCA),
the state militias may be called into federal 13service under command of the
President, acting as the commander in chief.
B. The Posse Comitatus Act: AdditionalLimits on FederalPower
The presidential power to deploy armed forces upon the populace is
defined in Title 10, Chapter 18 of the U.S. Code (Code), Military Support
for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, commonly referred to as the Posse
Comitatus Act (PCA). 14 This law limits the presidential use of federal
assets to avoid infringing upon the police powers of the state, while
providing a mechanism
for the use of armed forces against US citizens
15
arise.
need
the
should
Taken literally, posse comitatus means the "force of the county."' 6 The
Act is actually a criminal statute of the Code. The PCA states in its
entirety:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years,
17
or both.
The brevity and vagueness of the PCA has resulted in numerous exceptions
to the law as it exists today.' 8 To date, no president has been prosecuted for
violations in relation to the law. 19
The PCA has a long and convoluted history that has led to minor and
gross misinterpretations of the law in theoretical discussion, practical

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Shaw, supra note 1, at 43-44.
10 U.S.C.S. § 12304 (LexisNexis 2008).
Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
See id.
Brinkerhoff, supra note 4 (citing COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY (1971)).

17.

18 U.S.C. § 1385

18.

CURRIER, supra note 4, at 9-11, 17-28.

19. Craig Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus, J. HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct.
2000), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm.
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discourse, and tactical implementation.2 ° In 1788, Alexander Hamilton's
FederalistPaperNo. 29 influenced the Constitutional Ratification debates
by introducing the term posse comitatus into doctrinal discussion at a time
when lawmakers were drafting and authorizing the language of the IA.2 '
Several historical events in the years between 1788 and 1878 would play
significant roles in the eventual drafting and incorporation of the PCA into
law.22 For example, prior to the PCA's passage, certain conflicts
highlighted the need for a federal response mechanism to quell civil
disturbances,23 including the Whiskey Rebellion, Shay's Rebellion, and the
Dorr Rebellion.24 These cases of civil unrest stimulated congressional and
20. See id; see also Brinkerhoff, supra note 4.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton); Eugene Visco, More Than You Ever
Wanted to Know About Posse Comitatus 3-4 (2001) (on file with author).
22. See Visco, supra note 21, at 3-20.
23. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 4; Visco, supra note 21, at 12-15. Several incursions
upon the Insurrection Act and the use of federal forces upon U.S. citizens occurred before
the PCA would be formalized with regard to law enforcement, such as vigilante actions in
San Francisco in 1851, the Kansas Troubles from 1854 to 1857, the Utah Expedition of
1857, and the Harpers Ferry Incident of 1859. Visco, supra note 21, at 12-15. Ironically, it
would be the aftermath of the Civil War and the political pressures of Southern states to
countermand the use of posses comitatus during the post Reconstruction period that would
give birth to the PCA. Brinkerhoff, supra note 4. The use of posses comitatus was brought
forth as a means for Southern politicians to secure escaped slaves. Id. During the
Reconstruction period, federal forces provided the essential authority to facilitate the
Reconstruction and restoration of civil order to the Southern states. Id. In due time, the
federal presence in the South would be perceived as overbearing and enforcing unpopular
laws. Visco, supra note 21, at 22; see Brinkerhoff, supra note 4. The Southern democrats
favored a return to a regionally-administered legal system. Visco, supra note 21, at 22. This
would provide further impetus to remove federal armed forces from the South, and the
Southern-controlled Congress of 1878 eventually passed the PCA into law. Id; see
Brinkerhoff, supra note 4.
24.

ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES

tN

DOMESTIC

DISORDERS, 1789-1878, at 4-7 (1988); see also Visco, supra note 21, at 6-8; CURRIER, supra
note 4, at 1-3. Daniel Shay led the first domestic insurrection in the newly-formed Union,
which occurred from 1786 to 1787 in central Massachusetts. Visco, supra note 21, at 2. In
response to excessive taxation and confiscation of land and property to pay war debts
incurred from the Revolutionary War, internal discord between the state government and the
affected constituency escalated to conflict. COAKLEY, supra,at 4. Local farmers of western
Massachusetts clashed with state militia forces under the command of Massachusetts
Governor James Bowdoin. Id.at 5-7. This pivotal incident had a unifying effect, and drove
the central government to pass stronger legislation allowing the federal government to
respond to and quell insurrections. Id.at 7. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 stemmed from
the federal government's taxation of distilled spirits, and resulted in the first application of
military forces against the domestic population. Id.at 28-29; see also CURRIER, supra note
4, at 8. The disparity of the tax burden on small, individual producers, whose taxes were
assessed by the gallon, while large producers were assessed at a flat rate, served as a rallying
point for the general populace to organize and rebel against the federal government. Id.at
30-31. President Washington suppressed the insurrection under the authority of the Calling
Forth Act of 1792. Visco, supra note 21, at 6. Thomas Wilson Dorr led the Dorr Rebellion
of 1842, which was an insurrection occurring after a failed effort to create a new state
constitution in Rhode Island. COAKLEY, supra note 24, at 120-21; see also Visco, supra note

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss1/4
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presidential discussions concerning the utilization of federal forces against
US citizens.25 The use of federal military forces to recover fugitive slaves
for Southern slave owners elicited the need for federal assistance to civilian
law enforcement prior to the Civil War. After the Civil War, Southern
to prohibit the use of federal
democrats introduced the PCA into legislation
26
military forces for civilian law enforcement.
Courts consider military actions be in violation of the PCA, and construe
them as prohibited civil law enforcement actions, if the actions fulfill any of
the following: (1) "the military regulate[s], proscribe[s], or compels
civilians as part of the operation;" in other words, the military engages in an
action involving search, seizure, or arrest of a civilian,27 (2) "the military
directly and actively participate[s] in the law enforcement activity,"
including use of equipment or resources; the military action is classified as
violative of the PCA if an exception for the specific equipment or resource
does not already exist, 28 or (3) "the military activity pervade[s] the activities
of the civilian authorities;" that is, the
military participation overtly
29
influences the law enforcement outcome.

21, at 8-9. Rhode Island Governor Samuel Ward King requested federal assistance, as
tensions rose amongst Dorr supporters who were attempting to seize the Providence Armory.
Id. at 121. President John Tyler viewed the Dorr Rebellion as an attempt to undermine the
federal government's guarantee of the states' right to a republican form of government. Id.
at 119-20. President Tyler recognized the existing state government as the seat of power in
Rhode Island, and subsequently, efforts by Dorr and his supporters were stifled. See id. at
121,125.
25. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 4.
26. COAKLEY, supra note 24, at 344. In 1850, the Fugitive Slave Act required that
fugitive slaves be returned to their owners. Brinkerhoff, supra note 4. To execute the
recovery of slaves, U.S. Marshals were empowered to recruit and direct a posse comitatus at
the regional level. Id. In some instances individuals recruited into a posse comitatus refused
to act, and political discussions ensued in the administrations of Presidents Fillmore and
Pierce as to the use of federal military members as part of local posses utilized by U.S.
Marshals. Visco, supra note 21, at 10-12. Summarily, federal troops were allowed to be
employed in the recovery of fugitive slaves. Id. at 10. U.S. Marshals needed only to seek
the certification of district judges or that Supreme Court justice, thus completely
circumventing the requirement of congressional authorization of federalized forces in the
execution of civil law. Id. The Cushing Doctrine under President Pierce further entrenched
the use of posse comitatus by defining power of the U.S. Marshal to summon the full "ablebodied force of his precinct," including regular forces and militias, and to negate the
requirement of presidential authorization for the use of federal forces in law enforcement.
Id. at 11. In an effort to appease the Southern interest in returning slaves to their respective
owners, the use of federal forces to execute civil laws did not address the nuances of federal
forces engaging in civilian law enforcement. Id. at 12.
27. CURRIER, supra note 4, app.1 at 17 (citing United States v. McArthur, 419 F.
Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975)).
28. Id. (citing United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 922 (D.S.D. 1975) and
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 978 (1 lth Cir. 1982)).
29. Id. (citing United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379-80 (D. Neb. 1974)).
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Although the scope of prohibited PCA activities is quite broad, there are
twenty-six disjointed exceptions to the law that allow federalized military to
support a spectrum of governmental agencies and actions. 30
These
exceptions include civilian-military drug interdiction operations,
insurrections, civil support for threat mitigation related to weapons of mass
destruction, various environmental protection programs, and protection of
foreign and United States dignitaries. 3'
C. The InsurrectionAct: UnilateralFederalAuthorityfor State Entry
The President may act without state authority. The Insurrection Act of
1807, contained in Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the Code, provides the
executive branch of the federal government the legal mechanism to
domestically deploy federal military troops unilaterally in certain
circumstances.3 2
This Act authorizes the President to suppress an
insurrection, a rebellion, domestic violence, or an unlawful combination
thereof, by means of armed forces.33 To engage the powers under this law,
the President must consider whether conditions in the state are such that:
(1) [E]xecution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within
the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right,
privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured
by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or
refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that
protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the
United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any
situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to34have
denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
If such a circumstance exists, the President will issue a proclamation to
disperse, and will direct the insurgents to return to their homes.35 The Act
ensures that the President has legal means to maintain
national security in
36
circumstances borne of internal political unrest.
30. MATT MATTHEWS, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 81-83 (Combat Studies Institute Press 2006), available at

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi-matthews_posse.pdf.
31. Id. at 81-83.
32. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §
1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 331-35) (originally
enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443, 443).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (2006).
36. COAKLEY, supra note 24, at 7-18. In an effort to improve upon the Articles of the
Confederation, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 recognized the inherent need for a
legal mechanism by which the federal government could quell domestic violence, and this

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss1/4
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D. The John Warner NationalDefense AuthorizationAct of 2007:
Elevating FederalAuthority
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 200737
dramatically altered the balance of this authority under Title 10, Chapter 15,
Section 333 of Code, yielding the Insurrection Act of 2007 (IA of 2007).38
Specifically, the IA of 2007 substantively altered the PRCA, which is the
legal mechanism that calls a state's National Guard into federal service.39
The PRCA refers to the presidential power to "federalize" or call forth
state militias. This power has existed since the eighteenth century, as
40
defined by Article 1, Section 8 of the United Sates Constitution. Prior to
2007, the President was specifically prohibited from using this authority to

was the basis for the Insurrection Act. Id. at 7. Eventually, the need for federal power to act
in times of domestic disturbance to support the laws of the union was further defined in the
First Enabling Act of 1792, and its companion legislation, the Militia Act of the same year.
Id. at 19. The language of the Insurrection Act would be further shaped and solidified by the
Calling Forth Act of 1795. Id. at 67. The Insurrection Act, as it exists today in Title 10 of
the Code, is substantially the same in construction as the First Enabling Act of 1792. Id.
Until that point in history, only militia forces could be employed to quell an insurrection.
The need for "regular" federal forces and militia forces to be jointly deployed was not a
consideration until 1806, when Vice President Aaron Burr planned expeditions into
territories not at war with the United States. Id. at 77-79. Subsequent to Vice President
Burr's potential transgression, President Jefferson authorized the presidential power to
deploy regular forces with militias, with the intent to suppress domestic violence and to quell
insurrections. Id. at 83.
37. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
38. See CHARLES HENNING ET AL., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE FY2007 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: SELECTED MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY ISSUES 31 (2006),

available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33571 .pdf.
39. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, 325-26; see HENNING ET AL., supra note
38, at 31. Prior to the IA of 2007 the President was prohibited from federalizing or
employing reserve military personnel by § 12304 of title 10, which states:
No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under
this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section
12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b), to provide assistance
to either the federal government or a state in time of a serious natural or
manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.
10 U.S.C. 12304 (2006). The IA of 2007 was altered by removal of these prohibitions. The
IA of 2007 was rewritten to allow the President to use armed forces for public emergencies.
It states:
The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in
Federal service, to- (A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United
States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or
possession of the United States.
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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execute "any functions authorized by Chapter 15" of the Code, the chapter
which empowers the President to quell an insurrection. 4 1 Also, the
President was specifically prohibited from utilizing the PRCA to provide
"assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious
natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe. 42
Hence, before its repeal, the IA of 2007 allowed the President to engage
the PRCA without authorization from the state's executive or legislative
branch.43 The President, upon his own determination and without consent
from the state governor, could federalize state National Guard units during
major public emergencies such as natural disasters, epidemics, and other
serious public health emergencies, as well as terrorist attacks and incidents
that could potentially overwhelm states' capabilities to maintain public
order.4 4
Presidentially-directed military actions without substantive state input or
control have been highly debated from the initial Continental Congresses to
recent times. 45 The Warner Bill was no exception, and faced significant
resistance from the National Governor's Association (NGA) when
proposed.46 According to the NGA, the Warner Bill enabled the federal
government to usurp state control over a vital emergency response
mechanism, during what could be critical phases of hazard mitigation, risk
assessment, and establishment of essential command and control
elements.47
Importantly, the IA of 2007 highlighted the significant legal issues that
disasters and emergencies present to federalized military health care
providers and other medical care responders.48 The IA of 2007 created
situations where military medical professionals found themselves at a legal
41.

HENNING ET AL., supra

note 38, at 31.

42. 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2006); see also HENNING
43.

ET AL., supranote 38, at 31.
See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.

No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-06 (2006) (repealed).
44. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 31; see also S. 513, 110th Cong. § jl (2007).
45. See Visco, supra note 21, at 3-20. During the nascent days of the Union and
Continental Congress, the debate surrounding presidential use of military forces to quell
domestic disturbances focused on establishing the authority to use such force to maintain the
political integrity of the Union. Id. As this authority has evolved, the delicate balance
between state police powers and presidential authority has become a central point of political
debate in recent times as highlighted by the most recent changes to the IA of 2007. See
Visco, supra note 21, at 3-20; HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 31.
46. Letter from Janet Napolitano & Michael Huckabee, Nat'l Governors Ass'n, to
Duncan Hunter, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Servs. Comm. (Aug. 1,
2006) [hereinafter Huckabee Letter]; see also Letter from Janet Napolitano, Nat'l Governors
Ass'n, to D. R. Rumsfield, Sec'y of Def. (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Napolitano letter].
47.

See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, POLICY POSITION: HHS-03. ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL

GuARD (Mar. 5 2007), http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.
48. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No.109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
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nexus of laws, acts, and policies that were altered by the PRCA.49 Under
the IA of 2007, legal authority for National Guard participation in identical
public health emergency and disaster response activities would have
depended upon the Code title under which the National Guard was
activated. 50 The NGA rightly recognized the potential for confusion over
the power and authority of National Guardsmen called to federal service in
times of crisis. 51 The challenges of the IA of 2007 point to the need to
further examine scenarios, as well as the legal basis for, and status
of,
52
National Guard military personnel called to act in public health crises.
E. The Stafford Act: Limits on FederalPower
in Emergencies andDisasters
The Stafford Act (SA) is the primary legal gateway for facilitating
53
federal support to the states in times of disaster and emergency.
Determining the extent of federal support depends heavily upon the
magnitude of damage as assessed by the affected state's governor, and his
or her conclusion that the
state's emergency response mechanisms and
54
resources are insufficient.
Under the SA, at the request of the affected state governor, federal
support may assist the state in its response and recovery efforts. 5 The
request for a disaster declaration, as defined by the SA, must come from the
governor, and the SA specifically prohibits the President from declaring a
major disaster in the affected state.56 This gubernatorial origin of assistance
is consistent with constitutional language concerning application for federal
support from a state executive or legislative branch, prior to federally-led
entry into the sovereign state. 7
Numerous examples exist of states requesting federal assistance. Recent
instances of federalized military assistance given at a state's request
occurred after the Minnesota Bridge collapse in August 2007, in which
specialized active duty Navy diving units were deployed to assist with
debris removal and body recovery, as well as the coordination of DoD
assets in response to Hurricane Ike of 2008.58 The Hurricane Katrina
49.

Id.; see HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 31.
50. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 31.
53.
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
5121-5207 (West Supp. 2008).
54. Id. at § 5170.
55. Id. at § 5170; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 7.
56. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5170; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 7.
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
58. DoD, Navy and USNORTHCOM to Support Recovery Effort in Minneapolis-St.
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response is perhaps a better-known example. 59 Upon invitation by the state
to the President for federal support, the President can declare a state of
emergency or a disaster.6 °
Once the emergency or disaster response effort is federalized,
considerable federal resources are available for the affected population.6'
The state, by way of federally-approved funding, technically becomes
subordinate to the federal control of the response and recovery efforts.62
When directed to support disaster response and recovery efforts via the
SA, federal DoD assets and personnel are essential parts of the federal
government's response and aid package. 63 There are no exceptions in the
SA for law enforcement activities, including public health actions, which
64
medical personnel may need to execute by acting under federal authority.

Paul, USNORTHCOM NEWS, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.northcom.mil/News/2007/
080607.html; see also U.S. Northern Command Continues Response to Hurricane Ike's
Aftermath, USNORTHCOM NEWS, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.northcom.mil/News/2008/
0914081 e.html.
59. The Hurricane Katrina response also exemplifies how issues of state sovereignty
may complicate such a request, and the inherent controversy that may arise from an invited
federal military response. MARK C. WESTON, REVIEW OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AFTER
HURRICANE
KATRINA
15 (U.S. Army War College 2006), available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksi1535.pdf; see SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H.R. REP. No.

109-377, at 222-23, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/katrinahouse021506.
pdf [hereinafter THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM.]; Corey P. Hanrahan & Bryan A. Liang,
PromotingPublic Health and ProviderResponse to Emergencies andDisasters, 11 U. PA. J.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 29 (2008) (describing confused emergency response requests and
resource allocations, and conflict between state and federal authorities).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207; see Joseph R. Barnes, Amend the Stafford Act to Fund
Emergency State Use of the National Guard, J. HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 2002),
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumal/Commentary/barnesstafford.htm.
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supranote 2, at 41-43.
62. Note, however, that the President may activate federal support functions under
emergency authority without state governor request if primary responsibility of laws of the
United States are affected by the disaster inside of that state (i.e., a disaster impacting federal
properties or personnel stationed/employed in the affected state), or declare a significant
public health emergency via the Department of Health and Human Services. STEVE
BOWMAN ET AL., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,

HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD DISASTER
RESPONSE 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf; see also
JENNIFER ELSEA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS FOR DISASTER
ASSISTANCE: LEGAL ISSUES 4-6 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

RS22266.pdf. The President can declare a catastrophe an Incident of National Significance
or National Emergency, which summarily federalizes the disaster response. See 50 U.S.C. §
1631 (2000); Bowman et al., supra. Neither of these last two mechanisms negates
restrictions of the PCA or requirements of the SA and the IA. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., supra note 2, at 7.
63. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supranote 2, at 41-43.
64. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207; ELSEA,supra note 62, at 4-6.
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It should be noted that federal DoD support may be directly requested by
65
the affected state's governor through an "immediate response request.,
The immediate response request authorizes federal active duty military
commanders co-located in the disaster area to support response activities
for a loosely-defined period of time ranging from seventy-two hours to ten
days.66 Under this immediate response request, local active duty military
commanders are required to keep their respective military chains of
command in place, so they can be informed of specific responsibilities and
activities.67
The immediate response request authority defined in the SA has been
referred to as a statutory exception to the PCA. 68 However, DoD
instruction 3025.1, Military Support for Civil Authorities, clearly states that
69
this authority does not permit support of civil law enforcement activities.
The immediate response request authority is reserved solely for the express
purpose of preventing immediate loss of life or great property damage.7 °
Extension of this authority can only be approved via the previously-defined
route-from the governor to the President.7 '
Importantly, beyond limitations of federal asset use under the SA, the SA
provides no specific language regarding the activation of a state's National
Guard.72 A state governor is expected only to have activated the state
emergency response plan; however, it is assumed that the National Guard is
an integral emergency response asset under "state active duty status., 73 In
65. DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, DIRECTIVE NUMBER
3025.15, at 4 (1997), available at https://eportal.usace.army.mil/sites/ENGLink/Emergency
Management/Shared%20Documents/DoD%203025-15.pdf [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE No.
3025.15].
66. AM. BAR ASS'N, HURRICANE KATRINA TASK FORCE REPORT 36 (2006), available at
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Portals//PDFs/SCOLNS%2Hurricane%2OKatrina%20Re
port%20Feb%202006%202.pdf; see DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, WMD
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT LEGAL SEMINAR II: SEMINAR REPORT 9 (Science Applications
International Corporation 2002), available at http://www.dtra.mil/documents/newsservices/
deskbook/full text/OtherRelevantReferences/Seminar/o2011%20Report%2012-19-02.pdf;
see also Jim C. Winthrop, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and
Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), 31 ARMY LAW. 3, 3-5 (1997).
67. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 9; DEP'T OF DEF., supra

note 65, at 4.
68. CURRIER, supra note 4, at 9-10, app. 2 at 19.
69.

DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1, at

4-5 (1993), availableat https://eportal.usace.army.mil/sites/ENGLink/EmergencyManagement/
Shared%20Documents/DoD%203025-15.pdf [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1].
70. Id. at 21.
71. ld. at 7.
72. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207.
73.

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 8. State active duty declarations are

often addressed in an individual state's constitution or laws, such as the Military Veteran
sections 550-52 of the California Code. CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 550-52 (2007). Title 32
status of National Guard units requires coordination with Secretary of Defense, due to the
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this situation, the state governor has determined that state resources are
overwhelmed, and has requested a federal disaster declaration.74 In these
situations, it is likely that the state governor has previously activated the
National Guard.
III. MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

A. The National Guard
The roots of the National Guard trace back to the militia forces
established by the First Continental Congress on June 14, 1775, as the First
Continental Army formed to fight the War for Independence. 7 5 By 1777,
individual state constitutions, and ultimately the Articles of the
Confederation, created various pieces of legislation that laid the foundation
for establishing military forces at the state level as the federal government
began to take shape.76 The United States Constitution and Bill of Rights
further substantiated the purposeful existence of these state militia forces in
what are commonly referred to as the Army and Militia clauses.77 The
Constitution defines the application of militia forces and lays the foundation
of duality of service with respect to federal versus state service.78 This
duality stemmed from the responsibility of Congress to raise a standing
federal Army and the President's ability to call state militias to execute laws
of the Union. 79 The PCA and the IA would further define the instances
where federal and state military forces could be employed domestically.8 °
At the time the Constitution was written, militias were construed as
individual citizens and resident aliens who assembled in response to an
emergency. 81 The modem day concept of a militia, however, is that of a
collective group of able-bodied individuals enrolled into an organized,
uniformed, and equipped unit of the National Guard.82 These militias were
first described by General Lafayette in 1824 as national guards that were
similar in composition to volunteer forces the French formed during the

federal funding associated with this activation mechanism. See 32 U.S.C. § 902 (2006);
HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 39.
74. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5170.
75. Shaw, supra note 1, at 40.
76. Id. at 43-44.
77. Id.
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Shaw, supra note 1, at 43-44.
79. Shaw, supra note 1, at 47-48, 53.
80.

Id. at 55, 63; PAUL SCHEIPS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC

DISORDERS, 1945-1992, at 4-5 (Center of Military History) (2005).
81. Shaw, supra note 1, at 44.
82. Id. at 54.
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French Revolution. 83 New York militias then assumed the title of National
Guards, and public acceptance of the term ensued. It is this definition that
is used when referring to the National Guard of today.84
Today's National Guard exists in all 50 states and all U.S.-held
territories. 85 Its composition of community members, and its local
presence, yields the ideal immediate response capability in times of crises.
B. Mechanisms ofNational GuardActivation
Currently, there are four mechanisms through which the National Guard
of any state can be activated to provide support in times of crises. First, the
governor of an affected state can activate the National Guard in a "state
active duty status., 86 From the state perspective, the benefit of state active
duty status is that the state governor retains control of the National Guard87
forces, and can activate forces more rapidly than in any other manner.
Also, state active duty National Guard forces from other states may be
mobilized to provide assistance to a disaster-affected state via Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs).88

83.
84.

Id.
Id.at 55.

85.

NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, NATIONAL GUARD FACT SHEET, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

(FY2005) 1 (2006), available at http://www.ngb.army.mil/media/factsheets/ARNG_
FactsheetMay 06.pdf
86. NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 85, at 4. In this manner, National Guard
members are considered state employees working directly for the governor and receiving
payment from state coffers. National Guard personnel that are state active duty do not
receive all the benefits of active duty federal service member, including: time applied to
retirement status; federal pay scale; and protections afforded under the Soldier's and Sailor's
Relief Act and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. State
active duty service is viewed as the least preferable status to the service member, due to lack
of federal benefits and the lack of certain personal legal protections. See NAT'L GUARD
BUREAU, supra note 85, at 4; NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, NATIONAL GUARD DUTY STATUS
CHART (2007), available at http://www.ngb.army.mil/ll/LL/publications/misc/statuschart.pdf
[hereinafter NATIONAL GUARD DUTY STATUS CHART].
87. DAVID R. BROWN, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL., RELEVANCE OF NATIONAL GUARD UNITS
IN THE PREPARATION AND RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS 10 (2006), available at

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil285.pdf;
see also NATIONAL
GUARD DUTY STATUS CHART, supra note 86.
88. BROWN, supra note 87, at 6. EMACs provide a legal means of lending disaster
support and requesting support from states that have entered into this type of agreement.
Through EMACs, National Guard personnel are activated as "state active duty" of their
respective state. They are administratively attended to by their respective states, even
though they might be assigned to another state for disaster assistance and placed into the
command structure of the affected state. Large scale deployments from multiple states may
become administratively burdensome. This is due to each state affording different benefits
and protections to their National Guard personnel.

See THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM.,

supra note 59, at 249-50.
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The second means of calling up the National Guard to active duty is
under the authority of Title 32 of the Code, which is derived from Article 1,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution.89 A state governor would
coordinate this type of activation through the state Adjutant General (AG)
of the National Guard. 90 The AG would request Title 32 authority and
91
funding from the Secretary of Defense via the National Guard Bureau.
Under this authority, the National Guard acts under direction of the state
governor and its activities are funded by both state and federal
appropriations. 92 For example, the state funds five percent and the federal
government funds ninety-five percent of California State National Guard
missions when activated under Title 32 authority. 93 Generally, a state
governor applies for Title 32 authority when he or she determines that the
disaster at hand is beyond the capabilities of local response organizations,
and EMAC provided aid would not be sufficient. 94 Note, however, that
legally, in both state active duty status and under Title 32 capacities above,
National Guard members are not subject to limitations of the PCA because
95
they are strictly under the authority of the state governor.
Under a third method, the President may directly and exclusively call the
National Guard to federal service under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.96 In this
manner, the National Guard operates directly under the federal DoD, is
directed by the President,
and its activities are funded in whole by the
97
federal government.
It bears emphasizing that National Guard personnel operating under Title
10 authority are subject to the limitations concerning the use of force as
construed by the PCA, while Title 32 National Guard personnel are not. 98 It
is this area in particular, i.e., whether National Guard members are acting in
a federal or state capacity, where confusion may arise as to how these
federalized forces can be employed. 99
89.
90.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 32 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 39; see BROWN, supra note 87,

at 6.
91.
92.

See NAT'L GUARD

93.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, THE CALIFORNIA PERFORMANCE REVIEW 1218 (Cal.

THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 39; see 32 U.S.C.A. § 902.
BUREAU,

supra note 85, at 4.

Performance Review Comm'n ed., 2004), availableat http://cpr.ca.gov/CPR Report/.
94.

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 8.

95.

See NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 85, at 4. These activation statuses do not

implicate the PCA because the National Guard personnel are employed in a federalized
capacity. See also NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 87.

96.
97.
98.
99.

10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006).
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN CoMM., supra note 59, at 39, 41.
See NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 85, at 3-4.
See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 8-14; STEVEN L. MILLER,

AIR UNIV., Am COMMAND & STAFF COLL., THE MILITARY, DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT,

AND

POSSE

COMITATUS:

A

TIME
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The fourth and final mechanism of activation is a hybrid method, which
was proposed by President Bush during the Hurricane Katrina response. 00
In this rarely-used approach, the President and the governor of a disasteraffected state can both authorize a state National Guard commander under
Title 10 status to retain Title 32 authority. 01 In this mixed federal-state
status, "the National Guard commander reports to both the governor (for
state requirements) and the supported combatant commander (for DoD
mission assignments)."' 1 2 Placing National Guard leadership in a mixedstatus allows Title 32 personnel to be placed under a Title 10 and 32
command structure
while preserving the various Title statuses of
03
subordinate units.
C. DisasterResponse Legal Conflict
National Guard medical personnel acting under state authority are not
subject to the civil law enforcement limitations of the PCA. 10 4 However,
federalizing National Guard medical personnel called to duty under Title 10
authority essentially imposes roadblocks to law enforcement activities,
05
including public health actions that may be part of a disaster response.1

https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2000/acsc/00- 120.pdf;

DEF. THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DOMESTIC WMD INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEGAL
DESKBOOK (2003), available at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/publications/deskbook/

index.cfm.
100. THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 206-07. During Hurricane
Katrina, the President had desired to place the Louisiana National Guard in a federalized
status to unify response efforts. Id.at 206. President Bush opted to offer Louisiana
Governor Blanco an alternative to federalizing her National Guard personnel through a letter
titled "Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent and Use of Dual
Status Commander for JTF Katrina," placing Lt. Gen. Honore from Northern Command in
charge of Joint Task Force Katrina, while simultaneously being a member of the Louisiana
National Guard. Id.The letter stated:
In order to enhance Federal and State efforts, and if you grant permission, I
would like to appoint the Regular Army officer commanding the Federal Joint
Task Force Katrina to be an officer in the Louisiana National Guard. I would
assign him to command the National Guard forces under my command.
Id. Governor Blanco declined to surrender her National Guard personnel to federal
command. Id.at 207.
101. See AM. BAR ASs'N, supra note 66, at 27; National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 516, 117 Stat. 1392, 1461 (2003).
102. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 66, at 27.
103. See 32 U.S.C. § 325(a) (2006).
104.

See NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 85, at 4.

105. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 23; see also ELSEA, supra note 62, at 2;
BOWMAN, supra note 62, at 9; WESTON, supra note 59, at 4-6. Forced vaccination, isolation,
and quarantine of a civilian populace during a public health emergency would be prohibited
by PCA restrictions should federalized military medical personnel be in charge of enforcing
or administrating such efforts. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 11-
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This may impair vital public health measures, depending on the nature of
the emergency and required protective measures. Also, Title 32 National
Guard medical personnel supporting a mixed status leadership may be
subject to legal prohibitions concerning public health actions that have legal
implications regarding tort liability if they act outside the scope of their
employment. 106

All federalized military personnel are authorized to perform their
military missions under Title 10 of the United States Code.1 °7 As
previously discussed, Title 10 forces are bound by numerous statutory
limitations when their missions encompass domestic civil law enforcement
functions.10 8 It should be noted that these limitations do not prohibit federal
DoD involvement in disaster response; rather, they ensure that such
involvement is conducted in accordance with PCA prohibitions, and due
respect for state sovereignty. 109
However, a PCA exception to allow protracted federalized military
support of sustained public health law enforcement remains nonexistent.11o
The DoD directive that describes the time-limited immediate response
requests by local and state agencies purportedly permits authorized entry
into the state to provide disaster assistance through the SA. 11 Thus, this
immediacy requirement arguably negates, at least temporarily, the required
1 12
routing through appropriate state and federal levels of approval.
However, both Title 10 and immediate response request methods of entry13
subject federalized military personnel to policy legal boundaries,
that activation must be in strict
including the specific 1 requirement
14
adherence with the PCA.

106.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(f) (2006). See also DEF.

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note

66, at 18.
See 10 U.S.C. § 121 (2006).
See NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, supra note 85, at 3.
See DOD DIRECTIVE No. 3025.15, supra note 65, at 6-8; DOD DIRECTIVE No.
supra note 69, at 2-3.
110. See MATTHEWS, supra note 30, at 81-83.
111. See DoD DIRECTIVE NO. 3025.1, supra note 69, at 2.
112. See id. at 2-3.
113. See DEP'T OF DEF., DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS, DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5525.5 (1989), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/
dod/d5525_5.pdf [hereinafter DoD DIRECTIVE No. 5525.5].
114. See id. at 14.
107.
108.
109.
3025.1,
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IV. PCA, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

A. Foundation
The deployment of Title 10 military personnel as an essential medical
response asset during large scale disasters with respect to PCA restrictions
must be reconsidered, given the changed consequences of modem-day
threats, and the increased complexity of emergency and disaster response
efforts. The PCA, as it applies to military forces, was drafted at a time
when such robust military medical capability was unforeseeable.
Furthermore, this possible conflict of between the PCA and current public
health laws has gone without scrutiny or testing in a court of law.' 15 There
is simply no specific exclusion to allow federalized military
medical
16
professionals to act in a public health capacity in today's world.'
The PCA's numerous exceptions attempt to dispel the inherent
vagueness embodied in the PCA. 117 However, the critical issue is whether
the SA would withstand legal scrutiny as a PCA exception to permit use of
the federalized military personnel and equipment for public health civil law
enforcement. Such use as a PCA exception is highly questionable.
The immediate response section of the SA is constrained by the brevity
11 8
action required to "limit loss of life or property from great danger."
the
of
This constraint limits the time during which local military commanders can
act without approval. 119 As previously discussed, the SA is a source
document for the DoD instruction covering Military Support for Civil
20
Authorities, which expressly disallows civil law enforcement functions.
Recognizing this limitation, Congress, in an attempt to expedite a more
prominent federal military presence during future disasters, successfully
passed the Insurrection Act of 2007 with limited public debate. The Act
expressly allowed federalized National Guard activation without state
involvement.' 21 There is little doubt that its ease of passage was facilitated
by the federal government's desire
to quickly remedy the marred disaster
122
response to Hurricane Katrina.
In hindsight, however, this policy change created a confluence of
juxtaposed disaster and use of military support laws, which only added to

115. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17; See also DEF.
THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, §4, at 15-17.
116.

See MATTHEWS, supra note 30, at 81-83.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id.
at 71-72.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5170(b) (2006).
See DoD DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1, supra note 69, at 7.
Id. at 2-5.
Huckabee Letter, supra note 46; Napolitano Letter, supra note 46.
See id.
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the confused interpretations of the PCA. 12 3 The inclusion of categorical
justifications for military intervention in natural disasters, public health
emergencies, and epidemics interjected a premature federalized military
presence, and impinged upon state police powers. 124 Ultimately, the
challenges associated with such circumstances resulted in the rescission of
the IA of 2007.125
Note that merely returning the legal status of a federalized National
Guard to the status quo ante does not remediate the legal problems that
Congress intended to rectify with the IA of 2007. Instead, the effort to
enhance legal clarity was simply misplaced, and should have been directed
to the PCA in some form or another.
B. Examples
When acting as a federal entity under Title 10, federalized National
Guards, or active duty military medical professionals, are constrained
by
26
the PCA and prohibited from acting in law enforcement roles.1
Practical instances, neither previously defined nor contemplated by law,
create confusion as to the boundaries of military medical professionals
serving in federal roles. For example, public health laws related to
quarantine powers by any Title 10 personnel acting in a medical support
role, as well as potential medical liability, may have significant legal
ramifications.127 These concerns are discussed below.
1. Quarantine Powers
The potential for the complete collapse of a state's public health
infrastructure in response to a human-sourced epidemic or to one borne of
natural means begs the question: Who will enforce either state or federal
quarantine orders in the absence of state public health personnel?
128
The authority to quarantine exists at both the state and federal level.
State police power is the primary tool for limiting the spread of contagious

123. See id.
124. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 38, at 31.
125. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325-36 (2008).
126. DoD DIRECTIVE NO. 5525.5, supra note 113, at 14.
127.

DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15; DEF. THREAT REDUCTION

AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 11 -18.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2006).
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disease within state boundaries.1 29 When interstate commerce is affected,
federal quarantine authority is employed to prevent disease transmission.'3
Ideally, a state public health official would be the issuing authority for
quarantine orders, irrespective of a federal declaration of disaster. State
public health departments would be working in concert with nonfederalized or joint state-federal federalized National Guard members.
Given the option, having the National Guard remain in a non-federalized or
joint state-federalized status would still permit National Guard personnel to
enforce quarantine restrictions. In the absence of a recognized state public
health representative or department, non-federalized National Guard
personnel could assume authority in issuing quarantine orders, and the
governor could have authority to enforce those orders.
However, should a federalized National Guard or a Title 10 active duty
DoD military member execute or even support enforcement or issuance of
quarantine orders, would the PCA bind such medical personnel, who
operate under federal authority? Title 42 of the U.S. Code indicates that
United States officers must observe state health laws.131 Title 42 indirectly
addresses the use of U.S. (i.e., federalized) military personnel in enforcing,
or aiding, a state-mandated quarantine effort. As noted in the Code:
The quarantines and other restraints established by the health laws of any
state, respecting any vessels arriving in, or bound to, any port or district
thereof, shall be duly observed.., by the military officers commanding
in any fort or station upon the seacoast; and all such officers of the
United States shall faithfully aid in the execution of such quarantines and
health laws, according to their respective powers and within their
respective precincts, and as they shall be directed,
from time to time, by
32
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 1
As this section of the Code reads, federalized military officers could
enforce quarantines, particularly those co-located in the affected state. 33 At
least with respect to ports and vessels, a federalized National Guard
enforcing a state or federally-mandated quarantine order would be legally
justified in doing so, and should not be limited by the PCA. 134 A dual chain
of command would be possible since these federalized Guardsmen would

129. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905); see Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Jacobson v Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 576, 576 (2005).

130.
131.
132.
133.

42 U.S.C. § 264 (Supp. V 2005).
42 U.S.C. § 97 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. §243.
42 U.S.C. § 97.
DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 17; see 42 U.S.C. § 268

(2000).
134.

DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 17.
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take direction from the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
state.1 35 Non-federalized National Guardsmen would act as agents of the
state governor, and could execute law enforcement functions in support of a
state or federally-mandated quarantine.
Yet the broader, modern questions about quarantine in circumstances
such as a bioterrorism or pandemic influenza create significant challenges
because they are outside of this historic purview.1 36 The possibility of PCA
limitations on federal military personnel enforcing a state-mandated
quarantine is a crucial concern that places military medical professionals in
a legal bind-they are first responders in modern emergencies and
disasters-but 137
are limited in what they can do when confronted with
citizens' needs.
In the absence of a state's public health infrastructure and personnel due
to a catastrophic event, the governor of the affected state would likely
consider the possibility of utilizing National Guard assets to ameliorate this
critical incapacitation. However, because of PCA limitations, Title 10
National Guard or DoD active duty personnel could not legally execute the
responsibilities of state public health authorities.1 38 In effect, governordirected quarantine and isolation of an affected state population would only
be possible with Title 32 National Guard personnel. 139 Title 32 forces
would not have to question public health directives that emanate from the
governor's office because they are acting as agents of the state and not the
federal government. Under the PCA as currently written, Title 10 forces
might be left questioning whether they could legally enforce quarantine or
isolation orders on an affected civilian populace during a time-sensitive
response.
This is not a theoretical concern. For example, confusion over whether a
military unit was Title 10 or 32, and whether it could serve a role in civil
law enforcement, surfaced during the 1992 Los Angeles riots.1 4 ' In
addition, Title 32 National Guard medical units, operating under EMAC
agreements and responding to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, questioned
whether they could legally provide treatment to civilians. In some cases,
National Guard units partnered with Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
135.

AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 66, at 25.

136.

See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 16-17, app. E at E-4.
See Id.
138. See Id.
139. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 16-17. This is another
reason why a state governor may opt not to surrender Title 32 National Guard medical
capabilities.
140. See SCHEIPS, supra note 80, at 441-48; Brinkerhoff, supra note 4; JOHN H.
137.

EBBIGHAUSEN, UNITY OF COMMAND FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: TITLE 32, TITLE 10, OR A

COMBINATION 49-59 (2006), available at http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?
CISOROOT=/p4013colI2&CISOPTR=561 &filename=562.pdf.
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(DMAT) in response to Hurricane Katrina in an attempt to avoid any
possible PCA violations. 141 Certainly, these same issues could resurface
during a state-wide, multi-state, or national disaster, particularly one
associated with a terrorist event. The delay associated with determining the
correct command structure in the midst of a disaster could be costly in
terms of the number of lives saved and the severity of the impact.
Because emergencies and disasters implicate national security and other
federal concerns, the President could utilize the IA to federalize the
National Guard, and provide Title 10 active duty medical personnel to
intervene in disaster response efforts. The IA would provide the necessary
142
exception to the PCA to allow entry of the federal government.
However, the PCA exception that covers emergency situations involving
chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction would not allow
federalized National Guard members to participate in law enforcement,
because it143prohibits these functions even under such extreme emergency
situations.
Would the IA ultimately be deemed the appropriate option if the
quarantine was the result of terrorist actions, rather than domestic in origin
or naturally occurring? Unfortunately no. A quarantine order enforced by
a federalized military command likely fails the first two tests for
determining whether a PCA violation has occurred. 14 4 Quarantine is on par
with seizing an individual's liberty. 145 This would be viewed as controlling
and compelling a civilian populace to adhere to a militarily-enforced public
health mandate. 146 A military-directed quarantine likely fails the second
PCA test as well, by virtue of the military taking a direct role in the
execution 1of
a public health law.147 Both of these powers are reserved to
48
the states.
What legal vulnerabilities might apply to medical personnel serving as
public health officials and executing quarantine or isolation orders? This
part considers, below, the Federal Torts Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary
authority, but it should be noted that the FTCA specifically precludes tort
141.

Carl J. Bonnett et al., Task Force St. Bernard: Operational Issues and Medical

Management of a National Guard Disaster Response Operation, 22 PREHOSPITAL &

DISASTER MED. 440, 445 (2007), availableat http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/22-5%20PDFs/
bonnett.pdf.
142. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2006).
144. See CURRIER, supra note 4, app. 1 at 17 (citing United States v. McArthur, 419 F.
Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975), United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 922 (D.S.D.
1975), and United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 978 (11th Cir. 1982)).
145. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, X; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
146. See CURRIER, supra note 4, app. 1 at 17 (citing McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194).
147. See id. (citing Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 922 and Hartley, 678 F.2d at 978).
148. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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actions that stem from quarantines. 149 However, questions concerning
constitutional violations, civil rights, and wrongful imprisonment may come
into play if a federalized military responder violates PCA restrictions by
engaging in law enforcement activities.1 50 A related issue follows: would
the civilian populace be legally accountable if they disobeyed a Title 10
National Guard-directed quarantine order? Civilians reluctant to obey a
federally-enforced quarantine order may be on solid legal ground if they
decline to cooperate because federal forces would violate the PCA when
acting under Title 10.151

In addition, a similar question arises from the responder's perspective:
when must the Title 10 National Guardsman or DoD active duty responder
consider use of military force to establish a compliant populace-if at all?
In recent U.S. history, National Guard and active duty forces have been
deployed to quell civil disturbances in response to desegregation protests of
the 1950s and 1960s, Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and 1970s, and the
1992 Los Angeles Riots. 152 These deployments were small in comparison
153
to the catastrophic disaster response associated with Hurricane Katrina.
These smaller deployments were accompanied by presidential
implementation of the IA, while Hurricane Katrina did not result in the
invocation of the IA, but rather a presidential federal disaster declaration for
the state of Louisiana. 54 In the case of the Los Angeles riots, the largest of
the pre-Hurricane Katrina deployments requiring joint operations between
federal troops and state activated National Guard troops, several post-event
of the use of
analyses highlighted the lack of clarity concerning the legality
55
force by active duty DoD and National Guard personnel.
These examples highlight the confusion created by the use of a
federalized military to address civil concerns. Yet as a security matter,
public health law enforcement is inordinately more complex when
considering adequate and effective responses to emergencies and disasters
that implicate isolation and quarantine.

149.
150.
99, § 4,
151.
152.
56-57.

28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (Federal Tort Claims Act Exceptions).
See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note
at 6.
See id
See SCHEIPS, supra note 80, at 441-48. See also EBBIGHAUSEN, supra note 140, at

153.

See EBBIGHAUSEN, supra note 140, at 16, 79, 88.

154.

See id. at 51, 60-61.

155.

See SCHEIPS, supra note 80, at 441-48. See also EBBIGHAUSEN, supra note 140, at

56-57; Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Lessons in Command and Controlfrom the Los Angeles
Riots, 27 PARAMETERS 88, 106-08 (1997).
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2. Compulsory Vaccination Issues
Beyond the use of quarantine, compulsory treatment through vaccination
may also be necessary to address public health needs. National Guard and
federal DoD medical units may have to support mandated vaccination
policies in response to a public health crisis. 156 Federal law has established
that vaccinations are constitutional both as protective treatment measures
and as a proper use of state police power to limit the transmission of disease
under appropriate circumstances. 157 However, the PCA potentially limits
the scope of federalized military medical powers to administer compulsory
1 58
vaccinations.
Courts have held that in order to protect and preserve public health,
states may employ police powers to vaccinate their citizenry. 5 9 This power
is highly relevant today, when potential bioterrorist-induced events may
require such vaccinations. These types of vaccinations are specifically
highlighted in most state emergency measures statutes to protect public
health and empower agents of the state governor to limit the transmission of
disease through compulsory (i.e. legally-mandated) vaccination measures
applied to state citizens. 60 For example, under Title 32 activation, National
Guard members administering a smallpox vaccine to a citizen after a
potential smallpox-based bioterrorist event would be able to enforce the
16
laws of the state for compulsory vaccination as agents of the governor. 1
However, if National Guard members were federalized, limitations of the
PCA would prevent them from acting in this capacity, and indeed, all Title
10 forces as well62 as active duty DoD personnel would be constrained in a
similar manner.'
This outcome is of great importance. For example, it is likely that
military members would be called forth specifically to administer smallpox
vaccinations within states in the event of an outbreak or bioterrorist attack
with this agent. This is because a portion of military members have already
been vaccinated against smallpox and anthrax, and hence may retain some
level of immunity not existing in the general healthcare provider or public
population. 163 Therefore, they are the natural first responders to engage in
and implement such public health efforts.
156.
157.
158.

DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 17.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17; see also DEF. THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 6.

159.
160.

See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25; Gostin, supra note 129, at 577.
See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.

161.
DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, §
4, at 6-7, 17; see also AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 23-3 1.

162.
163.

See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 23-3 1.
J.Jones et al., Future Challenges in Preparingfor and Responding to Bioterrorism

Published by LAW eCommons, 2009

25

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

Yet, if legal barriers exist to preclude or confuse such participation, they
will effectively remove a critical emergency and disaster resource.' 6 In
this situation, allocation of other critical resources, such as unimmunized
physicians and nurses, may be necessary; since this could hinder the
effectiveness of the response and potentially risk infection of these
providers, thereby removing these critical and valuable human resources
from public health efforts. 165 Such a circumstance would create a vicious
cycle resulting in a dwindling supply of healthcare providers available for
public health purposes. Meanwhile, the providers who are potentially most
capable would be blocked from the public health effort because of artificial
166
legal boundaries.
Further, the possibility of events requiring federalized forces to actively
administer compulsory vaccination programs to the U.S. citizenry is
growing larger in today's asymmetric battlefield: the homeland and all of
its citizens across states. 167 Military personnel, including the National
Guard, have a defined military command structure to support a response to
such events by using coordinated efforts and communications that are
neither dependent upon, nor limited by state borders. 168 However, the PCA
would limit significant portions of that federalized team from engaging in
public health response efforts,
and would again undermine state emergency
69
and preparedness efforts. 1
Unfortunately, this application of military capabilities, including the
National Guard personnel so activated, would be subject to the limitations
of the PCA. 170 Constrained by the legal implications of the PCA, the
federalized clinician simply does not have the authority to execute civil law
enforcement, including the administration of public health compulsory
Events, 20 EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 501, 524 (2002); see also Phillip R.
Pittman et al., Antibody Response to a Delayed Booster Dose of Anthrax Vaccine and

Botulinum Toxoid, 20 VACCINE 2107 (2002) (discussing anthrax vaccine and/or botulinum
toxoid inoculations in active-duty military personnel in preparation for Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm); Erika Hammarlund et al., Duration of Anitviral Immunity After
Smallpox Vaccination, 9 NATURE MED. 1131, 1134 (2003) (stating that several studies

indicate immunity against smallpox infection for many years after inoculation).
164. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17; see also DEF. THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 6.
165. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, §

4, at 6-9.
166. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 11-12.
167. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, §
4, at 5-8.
168. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, ESF Annex 13 at 1, available at

http://www.nmfi.org/natlresp/files/ESF13.pdf;

see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,

supra note 2, ESF Annex 8 at 9, available at http://www.nmfi.org/natlresp/files/ESF8.pdf.
169. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17; DEF. THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 6.
170. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17.
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vaccinations.17y In this circumstance, legal vulnerabilities would arise, as
they do when an attempted quarantine is implemented under the incorrect
Title. 172 Here, as in the case of quarantine, the discretionary exception to
the FTCA 7 3 may not apply to the actions of a federalized clinician who
may be acting outside the scope of his or her authority due to Title 10
status. 174 A Title 10 individual administering a compulsory vaccination
program, because he or she might not fit within an FTCA exception, may
therefore be subject to individual liability claims, as would both the state
and federal government.175

This transformation from health care worker to federal military personnel
creates a barrier to effective response, even when the provider is ready,
willing, and able to address the needs of the populace, and to fulfill the
public health goal using the established, effective tool of vaccination. 7 6 In
this situation, the public health goal will be lost in the concern over
activation authority issues, which are generally irrelevant to the provider
and the patient he or she wishes to treat.
C. Medical Liability Issues
The federalized military members, Title 32 Guardsmen, and state active
duty National Guard members acting in medical support capacities are
protected by several federal and state statutes, thus promoting the effective
and efficient delivery of medical care in times of crisis or disaster. 177 Yet
these protections
are based on appropriate activation of National Guard
78
personnel. 1

When responding in a Title 10 status, military members are afforded the
federal protections of the FTCA. 179 The FTCA provides employees of the
federal government immunity for civil acts that were committed as federal
employees and imposes liability on the federal government. 80 Emergency
personnel protections in the context of public health are further defined in
171. DEF.
4, at 6-10.

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL,

supra note 99, §

172. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 12-13; see also DEF. THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 10.

173.
174.
175.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
See id.
See id.

176. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, §
2, at 10; see also DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17.
177.
DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 18, 23.
178. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
179. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note
99, § 4, at 20. Federal military medical personnel also provides protections under the
Homeland Security Act and the Military Claims Act. Id. at 22-23.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2009

27

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

Title 28 of the Code, which prohibits bringing "[a]ny claim for damages
caused by the imposition or establishment of quarantine by the United
States. 181 This section also prohibits suit against the federal government
for acts or omissions of its agencies and employees if the claim arose when
182
they exercised due care in the execution of a statute or regulation.
The FTCA also provides protection for employees directed to act as part
of the discretionary function exceptions. 183 The Federal Tort Claims Act
makes an exception for federal employees only when they act within the
scope of their offices or employment, and therefore military personnel
whose actions conflict with the PCA would not meet this exception.1 84 As
noted above, inappropriate quarantine and compulsory vaccinations
administered by federalized military personnel are unlikely to be protected
185
by FTCA discretionary exceptions.
For example, in Berkovitz v. United States, the Court noted that:
[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for
an employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option
but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's conduct cannot
appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no
discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function
exception in the
86
conduct for the discretionary function to protect.1
Military medical professionals acting in violation of the PCA, which
specifically prohibits federal military participation in civil law enforcement,
do not appear to be protected by the discretionary FTCA exception in the
instance of a state-mandated public health law or action, such as a
compulsory vaccination or quarantine.187 Here, federalized military
personnel would be acting expressly outside of legal authority and
181.
182.
183.
184.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(o.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2671.

185. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17, app. E, E-4 to -6.
186. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988). In United States v. Varig
Airlines, the FTCA discretionary function exception was established, defined, and
determined to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort."
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S.
797, 814 (1984), citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 58 n.12 (1953). The
decisions of Dalehite and Varig Airlines were summarized in a two part inquiry in Berkovitz,
which required that conduct of federal employees must contain "an element of judgment or
choice" and be "grounded in social, economic, or political policy." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at
536-37 (1988).
187. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-39 (1988); see also DEF. THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY, supra note 66, at 15-17.
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established federal law when enforcing public health emergency orders,
which are law enforcement actions. 88 Hence, federalized military
responders may be subject to liability for injuries associated with important
public health measures.
Without protection, participation by National Guardsmen and federal
DoD medical personnel may be significantly reduced, placing a tremendous
burden on a strained public health system already faced with an emergency
crisis. This burden is no better exemplified than during the Hurricane
Katrina response; National Guard units, uncertain of how to proceed with
civilian patient care, opted to partner with DMATs to avoid legal issues. 189
This is not the best use of military and federal medical assets in the face of
an overwhelming disaster response. This legal outcome undermines
emergency and preparedness efforts.
D. Mixed Status Leadership
In efforts to retain response control, states may refuse to request disaster
assistance or refuse to allow a declaration by the President even during a
large-scale disaster. This situation has already occurred during Hurricane
Katrina. 190 The governor of Louisiana chose to retain control of the
188. Other legal protections include the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) and the
Military Claims Act (MCA). The HSA contains provides legal protections to those involved
in mass vaccination efforts that might be required in an outbreak of smallpox. Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). It specifically establishes
exclusive immunity for those administering small pox vaccinations during a declared public
health emergency. Id. Federalized responders are afforded limited protection for care
delivered via the Military and Civilian Personnel Claims Act, which covers "personal injury,
death, or property damage incident to military service... [or] noncombatant activities of the
military department." DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL,
supra note 99, § 4, at 22-23; see also The Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(4)
(2006).
Most states have individual emergency statutes and tort claims acts that mirror the federal
level of protection from liability when state employees are acting at the behest of the state
government. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note
99, § 4, at 23. By way of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, state employees
are protected from liability by providing protection from claims made against state
employees from citizens of other states or foreigners. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This has
been extended to protect state employees from actions filed from citizens of the same state.
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982); see also DEF.
THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 23-24.
Medical liability issues for federalized military providers appear to be sufficiently
addressed to the point of redundancy, except for compulsory vaccinations of a civilian
populace by federalized military medical professionals. See DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 99, § 4, at 25.
189. See THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 221-22; see also Jeffrey W.
Burkett, Command and Control of Military Forces in the Homeland, 54 JOINT FORCE Q., 4th
Quarter 2008, at 130, 131, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/
i5l/27.pdf.
190. It may also have served as a partial justification for the IA of 2007. AM. BAR
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Louisiana National Guard, even in the face of intense federal pressure to
request a federal disaster declaration.191
As noted earlier, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, if a state governor
deemed it unnecessary or undesirable to absorb a federal command
structure or presence of federal assets, the federal government generally
could not force itself into the disaster response.' 92 Such a state response
could create difficulties and handcuff federal efforts perceived by the
federal government as necessary to protect national interests, while the IA
of 2007 would have allowed for
federal entry by the President even without
1 93
a request by the state governor.
However, allowing such unilateral action by the federal government
would not make preparedness or response desirable or effective.1 94 Indeed,
195
such an authority would have been highly problematic in Louisiana.
Instead, the Governor of Louisiana chose to retain authority over the
Louisiana National Guard personnel and assets, and by retaining this Title
32 authority, there were no PCA issues for Louisiana National Guard
personnel in their response to Katrina.1 96 In this circumstance, state public
health laws could be enforced, and Title 32 National Guard medical
personnel could execute those orders. Yet, the federal government could
not allow the state to retain control over the disaster response. 197 The
federal government attempted to place the Louisiana National Guard
Adjutant General under the mixed status leadership of a federal army
officer who possessed the authority to simultaneously lead both Titles 10
198
and 32 forces.
Mixed status leadership authority potentially undermines state
sovereignty and police powers. 199 It also creates dangers or political
pitfalls, by having a senior federal military leader answer to both a state and
federal command structure while commanding Title 32 units, whose
interests may compete with those of the affected state. z 0
Critically,

ASS'N, supra note 66, at 3; see also THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 220-

25.
191.

THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 206-07.

192. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
193. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-06 (2006) (repealed); see also HENNING ET AL., supra
note 38, at 31.
194. See Burkett, supra note 189, at 131-34.
195. See Id.; see also THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 206-07.
196. See Burkett, supra note 189, at 130-31; see also THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM.,
supra note 59, at 206-07.
197. See THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 206-07.
198. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 27.
199. See Burkett, supra note 189, at 131.
200. This would occur under a mixed federal-state status command structure. Id.
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undermining or confusing state control is contrary to a basic premise in
disaster management, that "[a]ll disasters are local," 20 1 and creates problems
of management in the administration of necessary personnel and assets. 0 2
Of course, the resultant chaos and mismanagement of the Katrina response
illustrates the unwise strategy that mixed-status leadership creates.
An alternative mixed status leadership, proposed by the Commission on
the National Guard and Reserves, would allow a state governor to
command Title 10 forces under the Title 32 National Guard Adjutant
General (TAG) of the disaster-affected state. The DoD has resisted such
authority, and continues to advocate for a parallel command structure.2 3
V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several approaches may mitigate the legal issues associated with public
health law enforcement by federalized military medical personnel.
A. Mixed Status Military Option
A previously proposed solution was to establish a legal basis for mixed
status military commands.20 4 This option was removed from the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA of 2008).205 Had this option
passed into law, the statute would have allowed federal commanders to lead
and direct National Guard forces.20 6 Essentially, this legislation reflected an
attempt to counter the current inflexibility of command as it relates to the
current Title 10 forces or Title 32 command elements operating jointly with
National Guard units.2 0 7

201. R. David Paulison, Dir., Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Address at the National
Press Club (Nov. 30, 2006), availableat http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/paulison/speeches/
11-30-06_national_pressclub.pdf; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at
15.
202. See generally Hanrahan & Liang, supra note 59 (describing state-based flexibility
in emergency and disaster response).
203. COMM'N ON THE NAT'L GUARD & RESERVES, TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL
GUARD AND RESERVES INTO A 2 1ST-CENTURY

OPERATIONAL FORCE: FINAL REPORT TO

CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 108-112 (U.S. G.P.O. 2008) available at
http://www.cngr.gov/Final%20Report/CNGR-final%20report%20with%20cover.pdf;
see
also Burkett, supra note 189, at 135.
204. NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER: "MIXED STATUS FORCES" PROVISION
OF THE HOUSE VERSION OF HR. 1585 (2007), available at http://www.ngb.army.mil/ll/

analysisdocs/2008/Mixed%20Status%20Forces%20sec%20ofo2OHR 1585.pdf.
205. See Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122
Stat. 3 (2008); NAT'L GUARD BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, FY08 NDAA SIDE BY SIDE
(DRAFT AS OF AUG. 24, 2007), available at http://www.ngb.army.mil/ll/analysisdocs/

2008/FY08%20NDAA/Analysis,%20side%20by%20side,%2024Aug07.pdf.
206. Id.
207. See id
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However, this option lacked state governor approval because it placed
federal commanders in charge of non-federalized National Guard forces,
and the National Guard Bureau re-emphasized the unconstitutionality of
placing a federal officer in charge of state-controlled militia. 0 8 This
solution therefore addressed neither the fundamental conflict between Title
10 and Title 32 National Guard activation, nor the legal status and
Guard members participating in public
limitations of federalized 20National
9
health response activities.
Another potential mixed status approach involves placing certain Title 10
forces under the command of Title 32 military leadership under the
direction of the disaster-affected state's executive. 210 This type of mixed
status could be constructed in such a way that specific military professions,
specifically health care personnel engaged in public health activities, might
be considered for such missions. By allowing these Title 10 military
medical professionals to become Title 32 forces, temporary de-federalized
service members would avoid PCA violations and would be afforded
various legal protections of Title 32. However, this effort may be
cumbersome because it would not only require new legislation, but also
would present the challenge of identifying which professionals, acting in
which capacities, would allow Title 32 leadership of these carved-out Title
10 professionals. Although this is theoretically possible, in the field, the
status of National Guard personnel would be very difficult to discern,
particularly if medical professionals were acting in multiple roles that
included, but were not limited to, public health.
B. Posse Comitatus Options
The successful effort to repeal the IA of 2007 rectifies the quandaries of
usurping state control of National Guard assets, but leaves historical PCA
issues in place. 2 1 Resolving issues stemming from PCA concerns requires
addressing these concerns through legislative reform. These options
include recodifying the PCA as an organic statute of Title 10 of the Code,
or substantively integrating public health into the PCA as a functional
exception. These options are discussed below.
1. Title 10 Recodification
Several proposals have attempted to address the issue of legal conflict
with respect to federal military medical assets. One key proposal is to
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Burkett, supranote 189, at 134.
211. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325-26 (2008).
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clarify the PCA by recodifying the law under Title 10 of the Code.2 12
Purportedly, this solution would provide legal guidelines for use of the
federal armed forces.21 3 Placing such guidance in Title 10, Chapter 18,
Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, would permit
local DoD forces acting as first responders greater latitude in the initial
phases of a multi-agency disaster response.
For example, a revision of the PCA with respect to application of force,
which would allow military commanders to support law enforcement
activities while retaining verbal flexibility to adapt to yet undefined
situations, has been proposed below:
Title 10 U.S.C.:
(a) Any part of the armed forces, excluding the Coast Guard, is
prohibited from acting as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress.
(b) Exceptions to paragraph (a) allowing use of the armed forces must
meet the following criteria:
(1) the use must be triggered by an emergency, which is defined as
any occasion or instance for which Federal assistance is needed to
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert
the threat of a catastrophe-generally a sudden, unexpected event;
(2) the use must be beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities as
determined by the affected state executive; and
(3) the use must be one limited in duration and not one which
addresses a chronic, continuing issue or problem.
(c) Clarifications to prohibitions in subsection (a) are to be made by
regulations to be published in the Federal Register and printed in the
Code of FederalRegulations.
(d) This section is an affirmation of the fundamental precept of the
United States of separating the military and civilian spheres of authority
and deference to recognized state police powers.

212.
213.

See CURIER, supra note 4, at 10-11.
Id.
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(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 214affect the law
enforcement functions of the United States Coast Guard.
Under this proposed change, use of federal forces would be contingent
upon the affected state's law enforcement capabilities being overwhelmed,
defining a period of time, and an unexpected event occurring. Yet its
limitations in specification cause tremendous challenges in interpretation,
since these general terms provide little guidance to military commanders,
whether or not they are federalized. The suggested change is more
consistent with the language in the SA, DoD instructions, and immediate

response requests from states to the military, with regard to the President's
ability to use "any federal agency" for disaster support; yet, by its very
terms it propagates the difficulties in determining when and where
federalized National Guard medical personnel can act in a public health, or

other, capacity.
In a very broad manner, this change might permit Title 10 forces to
support and execute certain law enforcement functions related to public
health and safety, life-saving efforts, and property protection under limited
time periods. This suggested version of the PCA could limit federalizing a
response by maintaining the state's application for federal assistance as
outlined in the Constitution.2 15 But, this version may still result in
questions concerning the permitted scope of law enforcement functions and
actions, both disaster and non-disaster related and public health and nonpublic health related, such as joint drug interdiction efforts and border
patrol missions. As a practical matter, this version of the PCA would
ensure only that the state governor remained in control of the National
Guard until he or she deemed it necessary to acquiesce to federally
controlled response; 216 yet it would provide little guidance as to when and
214. Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need
of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 980-81 (1997).
215. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
216. Id The American Bar Association (ABA), in their post-event analysis of
Hurricane Katrina and the federal response, identified the issue of using federalized National
Guardsmen in conflict with the PCA. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 66, at 28. In response,
one proposition was to rename the IA as "the Domestic Disaster Relief Act or Major
Disaster Assistance Act," or "the Domestic Disaster Relief and Insurrection Act." Id. at 29.
The re-branding effort would serve to "limit any political stigma from the name and thus
empower leadership to look solely to the circumstances of the disaster for guidance as to
whether or not to turn to this authority." Id. This recommendation is an attempt to soften
the image of a president who utilized the IA-like law.
The ABA also recommended leaving the IA as written. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 66,
at 29. The law has the inherent robust authority that only needs to be executed or the
willingness to be executed by the Executive branch. See id. at 30. The IA of 2007 has been
causally related to events that transpired between the disagreements on to how best handle
the response effort to Hurricane Katrina. See NAT'L GOvERNORS ASS'N, supra note 47. The
lack of state willingness to federalize the response at the behest of the federal government is
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where public health activities could be engaged, or the law under which
liability issues would be addressed.21 7
Indeed, this proposal's conception is significantly ambiguous as to public
health in general. Without at least some attention to common public health
actions, tools, and activities, it does not address the legal conflict of
federalized National Guard or DoD assets. As such, it does not modernize
the PCA with respect to the circumstances of today, and the use of
federalized military for civil law enforcement functions.21 8
2. The PCA and Public Health Integration
Redrafting the PCA, so that it addresses modem potential disaster
scenarios, is an option to address legal issues associated with deploying
federalized medical assets to support public health law enforcement.
Drafting new legislation would allow clarification of a law that was written
in the late nineteenth century, and premised on laws of the late eighteenth
century. The human-sourced disaster scenarios of modem day asymmetric
threats surpass the "niceties" of colonial American warfare, which served as
a frame of reference for worst case scenario planning of the day.219
New legislation could employ the strategy of making an express
exception to the PCA. Defining, through PCA exceptions, the scenarios in
which federalized forces could be applied to support civil law enforcement
functions, 220 and providing an opportunity to address any unique legal
circumstances not presently covered in existing exceptions, may be a viable
alternative. Providing defined guidelines for the application of federal
forces for civil law enforcement may facilitate asset deployment by
eliminating the need for timely legal confirmation 22of
what a commander,
1
federalized or not, can do in civil support scenarios.
Hence, the new legislation should incorporate the catastrophic disaster
tools the public health community deems appropriate to address events of
national significance which could overwhelm state resources.22 2 The
disasters themselves most certainly will dictate what public health laws and

openly viewed as the primary impetus for changing the IA in 2007. See NAT'L GOVERNORS
ASS'N, supra note 47; see also THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM., supra note 59, at 206-07;
WESTON, supra note 59, at 11-12; AM. BAR ASS'N., supra note 66, at 3-10.
217. See Hammond, supranote 214, at 980-82.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 4.
221. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 29; Brinkerhoff, supra note 4; WESTON,
supra note 59, at 18-20.
222. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at CAT-1 passim (Catastrophic
Incident Annex), available at http://www.leamingservices.us/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrp_
catastrophicincidentannex.pdf.
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tools may be employed for the benefit of an affected civilian populace.
Careful analysis of the military professionals (medical, environmental,
general law enforcement/marshal law, etc.) who might find themselves
executing civil law enforcement, including public health law enforcement,
can define when to maintain those professions in a Title 32 status.
Functional requirements of response, rather than legal means of activation,
would be the foundation for when federalized military professionals could
engage in appropriate response efforts. Even defining more specifically the
"law enforcement" activities that cannot be performed could provide
flexibility to allow all other activities, including public health efforts, to be
engaged clearly. With this forethought, pre-scripted deployment plans for
Title 10 and 32 forces could be considered in a way that would minimize
misapplication of federalized forces and potential legal confusion and
conflict.

22 3

Redrafting the Act so that it clearly defines when federalized troops,
including the National Guard and DoD assets, may be deployed for civil
law enforcement functions will also provide clear guidance to all military
commanders, and their federal agency partners.22 4 It will also provide
important clarification for states, and the National Guard itself, in
determining the scope of permitted activity. Indeed, defining the humansourced and natural disaster response scenarios that would overwhelm
regional infrastructure, and would require DoD support, including
federalization of the National Guard, will allow for a long overdue update
in the face of threats that could not have been perceived in the past.225
A redefined PCA could read as follows:
Title 18 U.S.C.:
(a) Any part of the armed forces, including Department of Defense active
duty troops and federalized National Guard under Title 10, excluding the
Coast Guard and Title 32 reserve forces, is prohibited from acting as a
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws, except in cases and
under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress.
(1) Actions by armed forces are considered meeting criteria of a
posse comitatus should any of the following conditions be satisfied:
(i) military actions resulted in the regulation, proscription, or
compulsion civilians.

223,

See Burkett, supra note 189, at 135.

224.

See MATTHEWS, supra note 30, at 72.

225.

AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 66, at 29-30; see Hammond, supra note 214, at 982-83.
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(ii) military actions directly and actively participated in civilian
law enforcement activity.
(iii) military actions pervaded the activities of the civilian
authorities.

(b) Exceptions to paragraph (a) allowing use of the armed forces,
including Department of Defense active duty troops and federalized
National Guard under Title 10, must meet the following criteria:
(1) the use must be triggered by an emergency, which is defined as
any occasion or instance for which Federal assistance is needed to
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert
the threat of a catastrophe-generally a sudden, unexpected event;
(2) the use must be beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities as
determined by the affected state executive; and
(3) the use must be one limited in duration and not one which
addresses a chronic, continuing issue or problem.
(4) previously approved exceptions of the former posse comitatus
act remain exempt.
(5) the use of Department of Defense active duty troops and
federalized National Guard under Title 10 medical emergency
response personnel deployed in support of disaster affected state
executing public health laws, including disasters and emergencies
requiring quarantine, isolation, or compulsory vaccination or other
public health activity, tool, or treatment of affected citizenry to
protect and promote the public health will be exempt.
(c) Department of Defense active duty troops and federalized National
Guard under Title 10 acting under subparagraph (b) will deemed acting
under Title 32 status and placed under Title 32 leadership.
(d) Department of Defense active duty troops and federalized National
Guard under Title 10 acting under subparagraph (b) shall be considered
federal employees for the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
(e) Clarifications to prohibitions in subsection (a) are to be made by
regulations to be published in the Federal Register and printed in the
Code of FederalRegulations.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the law
enforcement functions of the United States Coast Guard.
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(g) Willful use of the armed forces as a posse comitatus to engage in civil
law enforcement activities not previously exempted shall be fined an
amount commensurate with226cost of use of armed forces, imprisoned for
two years or more, or both.
This proposal specifies that both DoD active duty troops, and federalized
National Guard under Title 10 performing public health activities as
medical military personnel, are acting under the authority of Title 32. In
this manner, the proposal addresses PCA prohibitions directly. Further, the
proposal addresses the omission in the SA, which does not provide a
mechanism for activation of National Guard assets. In addition, to ensure
that liability concerns are clearly delineated as being under federal law, the
proposed PCA revision specifically states that the FTCA is the governing
statute for any tort claims associated with DoD active duty troops and
federalized National Guard troops under Title 10 acting in a public health
capacity. This approach addresses the key issues of activation, public
health needs, and liability, and allows DoD and National Guard personnel a
clear understanding of their permitted role in public health responses to
emergencies and disasters.
If military medical professionals' statuses are determined by what they
do, rather than whose pen signed them into action, public health
preparedness and response will not be hindered or confused by legal
nuances. Further, providing information within the statute, including
common public health measures, will give commanders and courts the
ability to discern what falls within the public health exception, and what
falls outside of it. Indeed, because of the functional means in the statute
that define the status of the military medical personnel, each can be
engaged in both Title 10 and Title 32 actions without a need to engage in
the complex undertaking of formal assignment or, indeed, even knowledge
of who activated them. In this way, military medical personnel under
federalized or active duty status can go forth with the job of responding to
emergencies and disasters, rather than wasting valuable time, resources, and
energy determining which documents and laws dictate whether they can
save lives.
VI. CONCLUSION

Previously, it was thought that a medical professional, acting as a
federalized member of a state's National Guard or active duty service
member, would administer treatment to a civilian patient only in extreme

226. This version of the PCA incorporates many of the proposed changes originally
suggested in Hammond, supra note 214, at 980-82.
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and rare circumstances. 227 Significant events in the last few years, such as
the World Trade Center attacks and the response to Hurricane Katrina, have
brought the legality of such a situation into the foreground of national
debate.
National Guard action by medical professionals and combat units under
Title 10 and Title 32 presents myriad complications, which may impair
disaster response and recovery efforts by way of PCA conflicts. The PCA
impairs the capability of National Guardsmen and DoD medical assets to
fill vital public health roles by prohibiting the execution of public health
laws, and creating confusion as to what is permitted action and what is not.
For the sake of clarity and effective and efficient response efforts,
resolution of this conflict is essential. Redrafting laws, writing additional
laws, or modifying laws may address some of these issues. But efforts
must be made to substantively alleviate the conflict created by the current
legal framework. Public health efforts, and the citizens served by these
efforts, are harmed by laws prohibiting federalized military providers from
acting to save lives. Laws must serve the people and assist in disaster
response efforts to promote the public welfare. Otherwise, we may be party
to the tragedy of having the personnel and tools to save lives, but not
having the ability to use those resources because of ill-considered laws and
legal barriers that do not take into account the practical nature of
responding to emergencies and disasters in effective and efficient ways.

227.

DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 66, at 8-9, 12-13, 16.
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